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Introduction
The global recession that followed the 2008 financial crisis continues to place a heavy burden on the world economy. One important aspect of the crisis that has caught a lot of attention among both policymakers and economists was the sudden, synchronized, and more than proportional decline in global trade relative to global production -the so-called "great trade collapse" (Baldwin, 2009) . While the causes and consequences of this event have been subject to extensive debate, the available evidence derives largely from aggregate data rather than from detailed firm-level data. 1 This is somewhat surprising, since the issue of firm heterogeneity and the fact that only a fraction of firms access foreign markets have become cornerstones of modern trade literature. To what extent have firms decided to leave foreign markets in response to the crisis? Are firms today relying less on imports and exports than before the crisis? And did firms perform better or worse during the crisis if they were active on foreign markets? A fine-grained analysis of the micro-structure of international trade in the years surrounding the financial crisis can provide answers to these questions by uncovering patterns in the data that would go unnoticed in an analysis based on aggregate data alone.
The objective of this paper is to provide such a fine-grained analysis using a representative sample of Spanish manufacturing firms over the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . Spain is a particularly interesting case to look into. On the one hand, the country was deeply affected by the financial crisis and subsequent recession. In the first half of 2009, real industrial production contracted by 21.4% relative to the first half of 2008. 2 Importantly, Spain went through very difficult times also after the financial crisis. Following zero growth in 2010, total production contracted again in 2011-2013, reflecting what is sometimes called a "double dip" recession. On the other hand, and perhaps surprisingly, the country showed a relatively strong export performance over the crisis period. Figure 1 demonstrates that the Spanish economy was able to improve its competitive position on international markets compared to other economies in Europe. For example, between 2007 and 2013 exports from Italy and France decreased by 10% and 7%, respectively. In contrast, exports from Spain increased by 13% over the same period. This development (celebrated by some as the "Spanish export miracle" 3 ) put Spain ahead of not only other countries in economic turmoil, but also countries that quickly returned to economic growth after 2008, such as Germany and the UK. 1 Important contributions using aggregate or sector-level trade data include Chor and Manova (2012) and Eaton et al. (2016) . We discuss the existing micro-level evidence further below. 2 Annual industrial production in 2009 declined by 16.2% relative to 2008. For real manufacturing exports, the same number is 21.2%. The data come from the Spanish Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) . 3 See, for example, the article "El milagro del sector exterior de España: admirable, pero con algunos claroscuros," published on May 10th, 2013, in the Spanish daily newspaper elEconomista.es. In this paper, we zoom in on the Spanish crisis experience. Adopting a micro-level perspective on Spanish firms allows us to investigate two important issues related to the crisis episode that remain obscure in aggregate data. First, we can disentangle the effects of the crisis at the extensive and the intensive firm-level margins of trade, i.e., we can separate a firm's decision to access foreign markets at all from the volume of a firm's exports and imports (as shares of its total sales and purchases, respectively).
This distinction is crucial for the purpose of our analysis and allows us to address two interesting questions: Did aggregate trade decline because of firms exiting foreign markets, or because of a contraction in firm-level trade volumes? And was the subsequent recovery and export boom due to firms scaling up their exports, or due to new firms entering foreign markets? These questions are important because a destruction of cross-border trade linkages at the firm level can have long-lasting adverse effects on the economy (Monarch and Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2016) , and these effects are not expected for adjustments at the intensive margin. Conversely, the entry of new exporters might soften the adverse effects of the crisis by increasing the potential for future economic growth, because new exporters in Spain are more likely to engage in productivity-enhancing technology upgrading than non-exporters (Hanley and Pérez, 2012) . In terms of methodology, we follow the literature estimating firm-level models of exporting and importing based on panel data (e.g. Bernard and Jensen, 1997, 1999) . However, this literature is typically interested in the evolution of firm-specific characteristics (e.g. productivity, management, or labor force composition) and how these influence firms' export and import decisions, respectively. In contrast, our focus is on the direct effects of the financial crisis and subsequent recession, i.e., changes in macro conditions that are beyond the control of individual firms.
The second issue we investigate are differences in firm performance and crisis resilience between exporting and non-exporting firms. Since exporting firms are known to be larger and more productive, on average, than non-exporting firms, their behavior can be important for aggregate outcomes. It is thus crucial to understand the performance of these firms in times of exceptional economic distress. Does exporting to foreign markets make firms more immune to shocks, or does it make them more vulnerable? This is an interesting question that should be settled empirically, as there exist theoretical arguments supporting either view. While allocating sales across various markets, domestically and abroad, insures the firm against an adverse demand shock in one market, there is also a substantial risk involved in exporting (e.g. currency risk, non-payment risk, transport risk etc.), and relying on foreign markets in times of a globally synchronized crisis might prove particularly harmful to firm per-
formance. To answer this question, we estimate differences between exporters and non-exporters in terms of size, productivity, and survival, so-called exporter premia (Bernard and Jensen, 1999) , and we study the evolution of these premia over the crisis years. Importantly, increasing exporter premia during the crisis could be taken as an indication that economies become less vulnerable to economic shocks through exporting. Furthermore, if it is primarily non-exporting firms that are forced to exit the market due to the crisis, then this might (in the medium to long run) induce a reallocation of resources away from non-exporting firms towards exporting firms, where they are put to more efficient use. The same logic applies if for non-exporters the evolution of productivity through the crisis and afterwards is less favorable than for exporters.
Hence, differences in crisis performance of exporters vs. non-exporters are relevant also for the long-run growth perspective of the Spanish economy.
The main results of our empirical analysis can be summarized as follows. First, the sharp drop in international trade that the Spanish manufacturing sector experienced in 2009 took place at the intensive margin, not the extensive margin. This means that, while the financial crisis caused a strong reduction in firm-level imports and exports, it did not prompt firms to exit foreign markets altogether. In the years after the financial crisis, we do see changes at the extensive margin, but we see more, rather than less, firms starting to enter foreign markets. As a result, there is now a larger share of firms involved in international trade than before the crisis. Furthermore, firms have diversified their export portfolios to include more distant destinations outside the European Union.
Second, while firms active in the export market saw their export volumes plummet in the financial crisis, this decline was not limited to exports, but rather, it was visible to the same extent in their domestic sales. This observation might seem surprising in light of the discussion about the great trade collapse. Moreover, the decline in exports was fully made up for (and even overcompensated) already by 2011. Those firms that entered the financial crisis as exporters have in fact been allocating ever larger shares of their production to foreign markets over the past few years. It seems that these firms have effectively compensated for the lack of domestic demand by expanding their sales abroad. In this sense, firms in the Spanish manufacturing sector are on average more, not less, 'globalized' today than they were before the financial crisis.
Third, we find that it made a significant difference for key economic performance indicators (such as jobs, productivity, and survival) whether or not firms were active on export markets when the crisis hit the Spanish economy. While all firms strongly reduced their output and laid off large numbers of workers during and after the financial crisis, firms that entered the crisis as exporters (and continued to export throughout the crisis years) saved more jobs, stayed more productive, and were more likely to survive.
One of the more alarming findings is that from 2007 to 2009 firms' average total factor productivity (TFP) deteriorated by around 15%. For non-exporters, TFP continued to decline by another 15% from 2009 to 2011. Exporters, in contrast, maintained about the same level of productivity in 2011 as they had in 2009. Our analysis also shows that aggregate TFP in the Spanish manufacturing sector declined as a result of the crisis.
After having documented these facts, we explore two possible explanations for the favorable development of Spanish exports after the financial crisis. The point of departure of both explanations is the fact that aggregate demand was hit much harder in Spain than in most other large economies, both within and outside the European Union. We argue (and provide evidence for the idea) that, as a result of this, the Spanish economy has become more competitive internationally through internal as well as external devaluation. This is the first explanation we discuss in our paper. The second explanation is that the more than proportional decline in domestic demand has prompted firms to substitute domestic with foreign sales. Importantly, such a response is not implied by the standard Melitz (2003) model, but has recently been rationalized in trade models in which short-run production costs are convex in total output (Blum et al., 2013; Soderbery, 2014; Vannoorenberghe, 2012) . We present some evidence drawn from our data that is consistent with this idea. However, we should like to emphasize that a rigorous causal analysis or an investigation into the relative importance of the two explanations for the strong export performance of the Spanish economy is beyond the scope of our paper. In a similar vein, we do not wish to claim that these two explanations are the most important, let alone the only, factors behind the strong export performance of the Spanish economy.
Our paper contributes to the small empirical literature that investigates firm behav-ior in response to the financial crisis with a focus on firms' trading activities. Two prominent studies in this literature using French and Belgian data, respectively, are by Bricongne et al. (2012) and Behrens et al. (2013) , who carefully gauge the crisisinduced drop in international trade along the dimensions of firms, products, and trading partners. 4 Closely related to our paper are the studies by Giri et al. (2014) and Álvarez and Sáez (2014) , which provide evidence on exports and firm performance during and after the crisis using Mexican and Chilean firm-level data, respectively. Studies with a particular focus on firm survival over the crisis years depending on firms' trading activities are Costa et al. (2014, for Italy) and Görg and Spaliara (2014, for the UK) . There seems to be a consensus emerging from this literature that most of the crisis adjustment in firm exports took place at the intensive margin. Exporting firms are typically found to be more resilient to the crisis and there is some evidence that firms' financial conditions played a relevant role for their crisis performance. 5 We complement this literature with evidence on both importing and exporting firms in Spain during and after the financial crisis. More generally, our paper fits into the large empirical literature analyzing firm heterogeneity in international trade. Reviews of this literature can be found in Bernard et al. (2012) and Greenaway and Kneller (2007) .
Our paper also relates to an ongoing discussion about the export performance of the Spanish economy in the period before the financial crisis. Antràs (2011) In contrast to these studies, we focus explicitly on the years surrounding the financial crisis, which involved a number of particular challenges and changes in the competitive position of Spanish firms. In addition, we document and analyze differences in firm performance and crisis resilience in relation to firms' export activities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data used in our empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the main analysis of our paper. We start with a decomposition of changes in total trade into extensive and intensive margins in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 analyzes the probability of firms to engage in exporting and importing before, during, and after the financial crisis. Section 3.3 proceeds by analyzing how firms allocated their sales across the foreign and the domestic market and 4 Abreha et al. (2016) provide evidence for Denmark.
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For micro-level evidence regarding the credit shock on exports in the global financial crisis see also Görg and Spaliara (2013) and Paravisini et al. (2014) .
which share of their purchases they chose to source from abroad (rather than domestically). In Section 3.4, we take up the issue of firm competitiveness and crisis resilience by investigating performance differences depending on firms' export status. Section 4 provides a discussion of two important factors that are likely to have contributed to the strong export performance of the Spanish economy. Section 5 concludes.
Firm-level data
The primary data source for our analysis is the Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE, or Survey on Business Strategies). The ESEE is an annual survey of about 2,000 Spanish manufacturing firms with 10 or more employees. It includes rich information on strategic firm decisions (such as pricing, international trade and investment activities, or innovation strategies) along with key items of firms' balance sheets as well as profit and loss statements. Importantly, the ESEE is a panel data set representative for the Spanish manufacturing sector at large and covering the period 1990-2012. This data set allows us to provide a comprehensive, high-resolution perspective on the micro-structure of international trade, and to portray the evolution of Spanish manufacturing over the years before, during, and after the financial crisis.
The initial sampling of the data in 1990 had a two-tier structure, combining exhaustive sampling for firms with more than 200 employees and stratified sampling for firms with 10-200 employees. In later years, special efforts have been devoted to minimizing the incidences of panel exit as well as to including new firms through refreshment samples aimed at preserving the representativeness of the data. 6
The sample we use for our analysis covers the period 2005-2012 (unless indicated otherwise fined by pairs of industries and size groups) in order to obtain consistent estimation of the parameters of interest. Summary statistics of the most important variables used in our empirical analysis can be found in Table A .1 in Appendix A. Throughout the paper, we express all value variables in constant 2010 prices using industry-level price indexes from INE (similarly to Guadalupe et al., 2012) .
A particularly important variable in our analysis is a firm's total factor productivity (TFP). We obtain TFP as a firm-specific and time-varying residual from industryspecific Cobb-Douglas production functions, which we estimate by the consistent three-step procedure proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) . This procedure derives from a dynamic model of firm behavior incorporating firm-specific productivity differences that exhibit idiosyncratic changes through time. The model tackles a potential endogeneity issue due to simultaneity between input choices and unobserved productivity shocks by using firm-specific capital investments as a proxy variable. In contrast to an alternative approach proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) , the model by Olley and Pakes (1996) also takes into account the issue of sample selection due to firms entering and exiting the market. This is potentially important for the period of economic turbulence considered in our analysis. We estimate industry-specific production func- A brief comment on the measure of labor employment that we use in our analysis seems in order. In contrast to many other firm-level data sets used in the literature, the ESEE data include an almost ideal measure of labor employment, namely effective working hours. This reduces the possibility of measurement error and thus mitigates endogeneity concerns in the estimation of firm-level TFP. Since the ESEE data also include a more common measure of labor employment (the average number of workers a firm employs during a year), we can investigate different firm-level margins of labor adjustment, viz. the number of workers (or jobs) and the number of effective working hours. Interestingly, we find very small differences in the within-firm variation between these two variables. This implies that the reductions in effective working 9 Detailed results from these TFP estimations are available from the authors upon request. hours observed at the firm level are fully attributable to workers being laid off and jobs being lost.
While the focus of our analysis is on Spain, we occasionally also draw on firm-level survey data from the EFIGE project, which was designed to enhance the understanding of how European firms and economies are affected by the process of globalization (Altomonte and Aquilante, 2012) . 10 3 Empirical analysis
Decomposition of changes in total trade
We start by decomposing changes in both exports and imports in the Spanish manufacturing sector into extensive and intensive margins. We do this along the lines of Bernard et al. (2009) and Behrens et al. (2013) using the ESEE firm-level data set. Total exports in any given year t can be written as the product of the number of exporters (the extensive margin) in t and the average value of exports per exporting firm (the intensive margin) in t: exports t = number of exporters t ⇥ average exports t . Hence, we can decompose changes in total exports (and analogously for imports) as follows:
where exports t ⌘ exports t exports t 1 (and accordingly for the number of exporters and average exports). 15% in exports and more than 20% in imports in the main crisis year 2009. Importantly, these changes took place almost exclusively at the intensive margin of trade.
More specifically, on the export side, average exports per firm decreased by 15% in 2009, which means that the intensive margin almost fully explains the overall drop in exports. On the import side, trade at the extensive margin even increased slightly in 2009, counteracting the drop at the intensive margin. It is interesting that exports quickly recovered in 2010 and 2011, in particular at the intensive margin, while imports had not recovered by the year 2012 (the last year of data we use in our analysis).
In 2011, both exports and imports decreased slightly at the extensive margin, but increased again quite spectacularly in 2012. 12 Two comments on this decomposition exercise are in order. First, the changes at the intensive margin that we examine here are changes that took place at the level of the firm. Hence, they may include adjustments at several additional extensive margins that are only visible at a more disaggregated level: the number of products traded, the number of destination and source countries, and the number of buyers and sellers for each firm. While we cannot disentangle these margins for Spain, Behrens et al. (2013) find in more disaggregated data from Belgium that even within firm-country-product cells the intensive margin accounts for 97% of the overall drop in Belgian exports caused by the crisis.
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The decrease in both exports and imports at the intensive margin of trade in 2012 stems in part from the comparatively low volume of trade by foreign market entrants in that year.
Second, in the above decomposition we hold all prices constant, so that changes at the intensive margin of trade are due to changes in the quantities traded (rather than changes in the prices of traded products). To shed some light on the evolution of nominal trade values, we examine annual variations in both sales prices and input prices. We find that on average firms lowered their sales prices in 2009, but only by 0.59%. 13 In contrast, the prices of inputs continued to rise in 2009, though at a lower rate (1.70%) than before or after 2009. Overall, we can thus say that nominal trade values dropped sharply in 2009, but that this drop is due to a reduction in the quantities traded rather than a decline in prices.
Foreign market entry and exit
In this section, we focus on the extensive margin of trade. What share of firms in the Spanish manufacturing sector is active on foreign markets? And how did this share develop over the recent period of financial and economic turmoil? When looking at the full sample of firms, we find that in the pre-crisis period 2005-2008 on average 46% of all firms were exporters, while 43% were importers; see Figure 2a . We observe significant overlap between exporter and importer status, reflected in 30% of firms in 2005 being engaged in both exporting and importing at the same time (not depicted).
This suggests that exporting and importing are complementary activities at the level of the firm, an issue that has been taken up in recent research and to which we will return below. Two observations stand out. First, there was only a very small decrease in the shares of exporting and importing firms in 2009, following the peak of the financial crisis. Second, both shares rose sharply in the subsequent years. By 2012, the shares of exporters and importers had both grown to all-time highs of 57% and 51%, respectively. 14 While these numbers suggest a growing tendency among firms to serve foreign markets, they partly reflect firm entry into and exit from production, as well as changes in the sample composition over time (due to sample attrition caused by nonresponse of firms, as well as due to the inclusion of new firms through refreshment samples).
For this reason, in Figure 2b , we balance the sample on firms that are observed in each
year from 2005 to 2012. This allows for a clean view on changes at the extensive margin of trade among incumbent and surviving firms. 15 The figure confirms that, 13 This drop was only slightly larger for exporters (-0.71%) than for non-exporters (-0.48%).
14 These are the highest trade participation shares observed over the period 1990-2012 (i.e., the period for which ESEE data were available at the time of writing this paper); see http://www.fundacionsepi. es/investigacion/esee/en/salgunos_resultados.asp. 15 Note that the sample used in Figure 2b is thus not representative for the manufacturing sector at large. It is in fact biased towards larger firms (in terms of output and employment), as these were more likely to survive the crisis. This bias explains why trade participation rates in 2005 are higher in the balanced sample than in the full sample.
whether we look at exporting or at importing, the financial crisis had a very small impact on the extensive margin of trade in 2009. Instead, we see constant or rising trade participation rates over time. The share of exporters has been subject to a slight upward trend that was only shortly interrupted in 2010, but accelerated thereafter and reached more than 51% in 2012 (up from less than 47% in 2005). Import participation, in contrast, has not changed much in the balanced sample. Before the financial crisis, the share of importers stood at about 47%. In 2009, the year following the peak of the financial crisis, this share decreased by one percentage point. Although it has been increasing in each year thereafter, import participation has not returned to its precrisis level by 2012. In any case, the figure shows that the overall changes that we find around the crisis years are rather small for incumbent and surviving firms. Importantly, the apparent differences in the evolution of trade participation rates across the full sample and the balanced sample (Figures 2a and 2b) can be reconciled by differential firm survival rates across trading and non-trading firms. We will take this issue up in Section 3.4, where we show that firms that entered the crisis as exporters had higher chances to survive the crisis than firms that were confined to the domestic market. provide a preliminary answer to this question. 16 In Figure 3 , where we balance the sample on firms that are observed in both years, we see very little time variation in export participation for most world regions that we can distinguish in our data: the European Union (EU), Latin America, the rest of the OECD, and the rest of the world 16 Information on the composition of imports and exports by world region is available in ESEE every four years. We find, perhaps surprisingly, that among these countries, export participation is lowest in Germany (41%) and France (45%), closely followed by Spain (48%), while
Austria and the UK have much higher exporter shares (56%), exceeded only by Italy (63%). German firms also report the lowest importer share (25%), followed by Italy (35%) and Spain (40%). 18 The highest import participation is found for France, where more than half of all firms engage in importing.
We next estimate a series of probability models for both exporting and importing.
This allows us to narrow down the factors that were crucial for trade participation over the crisis years. To do so, we distinguish between those factors that are directly related to the financial crisis and subsequent recession (i.e., macro-level changes taking place outside the firm and captured in our analysis by year dummies) and those related to the evolution of firm-specific characteristics (i.e., micro-level changes taking place inside the firm). The latter also capture indirect effects of the financial crisis (e.g. if some firms experienced a decline in their productivity over time). In order to account for (and exploit) possible complementarities between exporting and importing at the firm level, we estimate two equations simultaneously in a bivariate Probit framework.
More specifically, we define two indicator variables, one for the export status of a firm,
Exporter it , and one for its import status, Importer it . The variable Exporter it is equal to one if firm i reports positive exports at time t (and zero otherwise), and accordingly for Importer it . We assume that a firm exports if current and expected revenues from exporting are greater than costs:
where ⇧ e it is the unobserved (latent) net present value of current and expected profits from exporting. We assume that these can be linearly approximated as follows:
where X e it is a column vector collecting time-varying firm characteristics, e is a vector of parameters to be estimated, e t is a year fixed effect, e i is a firm-specific effect, 19 e ks is a constant specific to the industry-size-group combination corresponding to firm i in year t (with industries being indexed by k and size groups by s), and " e it is a 18 As far as imports are concerned, the EFIGE data tend to underestimate trade participation, as the questionnaire is limited to imports of goods and services that are used in the production process. 19 We impose different assumptions on the firm-specific effect ì , as we shall detail below.
firm-and-year-specific stochastic profit shock. An expression similar to Equation (2) is assumed for importing:
In contrast to much of the existing literature, we estimate the decisions of exporting and importing jointly. This strategy is motivated by recent evidence on fixed and sunk cost complementarity between the two activities (Kasahara and Lapham, 2013) . 20 We thus assume that the stochastic profit shocks are drawn from a bivariate normal distribution:
where is a parameter measuring the (residual) correlation between exporting and importing. Allowing (and testing) for > 0 is important in our analysis, as it tells us whether a firm-specific negative effect of the crisis that directly affected one activity spilled over to the other activity (and thus entailed more harmful consequences than the direct effect alone).
In the model described above, we are mainly interested in the year fixed effects, indicating whether the firm is operating a website). Including a dummy for internet presence in the equation for exports, but not for imports, is based on the idea that a website is important as part of the firm's marketing and distribution strategy, but has no impact on the firm's purchasing and sourcing activities. Importantly, the fact that X e it 6 = X i it leads to efficiency gains in the estimation. 20 Aristei et al. (2013) also investigate the two-way relationship between exporting and importing. 21 In alternative specifications we use estimated TFP (rather than labor productivity) to control for the firm's competitiveness, to find that our main results do not change with this modification.
In our first estimation of the bivariate Probit model in Equations (2) and (3) Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 report the estimation results. In line with the descriptive evidence presented in Table 1 have prompted more firms to access foreign markets. We find that the probability of exporting is 4.1 percentage points (or 9.1%) higher in 2012 than it was in the base year 2005. The same number for importing is 3.2 percentage points (7.3%). Statistically significant differences between pre-and post-crisis export and import participation are first visible in 2012. These differences cannot be explained by the firm-level characteristics that the literature has consistently identified to influence both exports and imports at the extensive margin (such as productivity), as these are controlled for in the estimation. Regarding these firm-specific control variables, we find that the results accord well with known stylized facts. We find that those firms that are more productive as well as those more intensive in capital, R&D, and skills are more inclined to both exporting and importing. Moreover, we see large and significant differences (with a two-digit margin) between foreign-owned and domestically owned firms, as well as between MNCs and non-MNCs. Finally, the results demonstrate strong firmlevel complementarities between exporting and importing (ˆ = 0.525, significant at the 1% level).
One important limitation of the bivariate Probit model is that identification is based on between-firm variation in the data, and that the model thus assumes firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity (denoted by ì above) to be uncorrelated with the other covariates. However, it is likely that unobserved firm characteristics with strong serial correlation (such as managerial ability) do not only affect a firm's decision to access foreign markets, but that they are also correlated with the other covariates in the model (e.g. productivity). Addressing this issue by estimating firm fixed effects in the Probit framework suffers from the incidental parameters problem and would hence result in inconsistent estimation of all model parameters. We therefore estimate a system of seemingly unrelated regression equations with fixed effects (SUR FE), where each (1) and (2)), as well as a system of seemingly unrelated regression equations (SUR) with fixed effects (columns (3) and (4) The estimation results for the SUR FE model are reported in columns (3) and (4) of There are at least two sources of persistence in export participation that we have not considered in the models described above and that are reviewed and modeled in Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Bernard and Jensen (1997) . The first is learning by doing, which refers to the accumulation of knowledge (through production and ex-
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Our data set includes information about unusual events that can change the scale and nature of the firm, such as mergers, acquisitions, and divestments. We exclude such firms from the sample whenever we exploit the within-firm variation in our analysis. This leads to a reduced sample size in the corresponding regressions. 23 There is strong evidence in the literature for self-selection of the more productive firms into exporting as well as importing; see e.g. Bernard and Jensen (1999) , Smeets and Warzynski (2013) , and Kohler and Smolka (2014) . There is also some evidence for both exporting and importing to increase productivity; see e.g. De Loecker (2007), Halpern et al. (2015) , and Feng et al. (2012). porting) that reduces future costs of production and exporting. The second are sunk costs for foreign market entry, for example in the form of information and distribution costs. Similar ideas apply to importing. While we cannot separately identify these two channels, we may hypothesize based on the above considerations that the firm's current and expected profits from exporting will depend positively on past export status:
In such a dynamic framework, a negative transitory shock to foreign demand due to the financial crisis would generate a negative effect on export participation that carries over to future time periods (implying gradual adjustment of the probability to export).
To allow for dynamics in trade participation, we specify the following model for exporting:
and accordingly for importing. Of course, the larger the autoregressive parameter (i.e., the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable), the stronger (i.e., long-lasting) is the dynamic effect. First, we estimate these models by the standard fixed effects approach with the right-hand side of the equation including the lagged dependent variable (LDV FE model). Second, we use the first-differenced general method of moments (diff-GMM) approach developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) .
In the LDV FE models, we apply the within-transformation to the data in order to get rid of the firm fixed effects e i and i i , respectively. Estimates of ⇢`in the LDV FE models serve as lower bounds for the true parameter values. 24 We find values of ⇢ e ⇡ 0.237 and⇢ i ⇡ 0.193 (both significant at the 1% level) in the LDV FE models. In the diff-GMM approach, the model is estimated in first differences to cancel the firm fixed effects. In addition to the lagged dependent variable, we treat labor productivity, capital intensity and foreign ownership as endogenous variables, and R&D and skill intensity along with MNC status as pre-determined variables. Lagged levels of the dependent variable, the predetermined variables, and the endogenous variables are used as internal instruments. We allow for the maximum number of available lags for use as instruments. To accommodate heteroskedasticity, we use the two-step version of the diff-GMM estimator. We estimate values of⇢ e ⇡ 0.382 and⇢ i ⇡ 0.373 (both 24 The Nickell bias for the autoregressive parameter, ⇢`, is plim N !1
, with 2 {e, i} and T = 7 in our application. significant at the 1% level) in the diff-GMM models. 25 Figure 4 summarizes the coefficients of the year dummies in these models estimated by both approaches. The LDV FE models confirm the increase in both probabilities for exporting and importing after the crisis (both significant at 5% for 2012).
The diff-GMM estimations, in contrast, cannot identify any statistically significant effect of the financial crisis and subsequent recession on trade participation. Importantly, none of our dynamic estimation approaches provides any evidence of a detrimental crisis effect on the extensive margin of trade.
Export and import intensity
Next, we analyze the evolution of firms' trade volumes (i.e., the intensive margin of international trade). Over the pre-crisis period, the average exporter was shipping 25 Neither for exporting (p = 0.8969) nor for importing (p = 0.5363) can we reject the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid (Hansen specification test of the instrument condition). For both exporting and importing, the Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors of order one is rejected (p = 0.000), while that of order two cannot be rejected (p = 0.1733 for exporting and p = 0.5363 for importing). Most noteworthy, however, is the shift in sales that we observe in the years after 2010, away from the domestic market towards the foreign market. Within just two years, exports increased by 29%. Domestic sales, in contrast, decreased by 28%. Hence, it seems that firms were compensating for the collapse in aggregate demand in Spain (in the course of the events associated with the European sovereign debt crisis) by channeling their sales into the export market. This was possible because other countries like France and Germany, the two largest economies in Europe and the top export des-tinations for Spain, had positive economic growth in each year from 2010 to 2012.
Spain, in contrast, had negative economic growth over the same period. 26 The finding that firms substituted domestic with foreign sales accords well with macro-level evidence by Belke et al. (2015) . We will return to this issue in our discussion in Section 4. Importantly, the observation that the foreign market has gained in importance relative to the domestic market has no correspondence on the import side, where domestic and foreign purchases were largely moving in parallel to one another.
We now use regression analysis to investigate the factors influencing the trade intensity of firms, defined as the share of exports in total sales or the share of imports in total purchases, over the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . We should like to emphasize the difference between these shares and the levels of firms' trade volumes; the latter we have used to isolate changes at the 'intensive margin' in the decomposition exercise in Section 3.1. There are three reasons for using the trade intensity rather than the log of exports or imports in our estimations. First, the trade intensity is an important measure of globalization at the firm level, which indicates how strongly firms are integrated into the global economy through international trade. 27 Second, the trade intensity is defined not only for exporters or importers, but also for firms that do not engage in international trade. This allows us to circumvent an obvious selection problem that arises when non-trading firms are excluded from the sample. 28 Third, we can use the full sample of firms to investigate how export and import intensity are intertwined by estimating the two equations (one for export intensity and one for import intensity) simultaneously. This also leads to efficiency gains in the estimation. For these three reasons it is both convenient and meaningful to use trade intensities as dependent variables in our regression analysis. However, for the interpretation of our results we must keep in mind that these regressions are not suitable for showing evidence on the great trade collapse as such, simply because domestic activity in Spain dropped substantially as well (as is clear from Figure 5 ).
We estimate a SUR model, where the first equation is specified as:
with ExpInt it denoting the export intensity (exports over total sales) of firm i in year t,
and accordingly for the second equation with ImpInt it (imports over total purchases) 26 Source: Eurostat at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/. 27 Behrens et al. (2013, p. 703 ) also examine ratios of international activity over total activity and point out that analyzing "the recent trade collapse using firm-level data on both trade and domestic operations [. . . ] is necessary to gauge whether international activity has been disproportionately hit by the crisis." 28 We explicitly model the process governing selection into exporting or importing in a robustness analysis discussed below.
as the dependent variable. 29 As we did above in the model for trade participation,
we assume E[" e it " i jt |·] = 0 whenever i 6 = j, whereas E[" e it " i it |·] = . In a first specification, we treat the firm effects, e i and i i , as random variables that are not correlated with the other covariates, and thus exploit between-firm variation in the data. In a second specification, we relax this assumption by treating the firm effects as fixed effects that are explicitly controlled for, and we identify the parameters of interest from within-firm variation in the data by using SUR FE estimation.
Overall, the regression results reported in Table 3 are consistent with the evolution of trade intensities shown in Figure 5 . Importantly, we do not find evidence that firms decreased their trade intensities due to the financial crisis. Hence, while both foreign and domestic activity declined sharply, firms did not become less 'globalized' in the crisis. On the contrary, we find a steady increase in the export intensity of firms over the post-crisis period 2009-2012, as documented byˆ e t >ˆ e t 1 for t 09.
In the SUR FE model, the year-to-year differences that we find are statistically significant at the 1% level for t 10. The rise in the export intensity identified in the data is not accompanied by a contemporaneous rise in import intensity, where we find no significant differences across years.
To substantiate these results, and to address similar concerns as in the previous section, we also consider the following dynamic specification of the model for exporting:
ExpInt it = ⇢ e · ExpInt it 1 + e · X e it + e t + e i + e ks + " e it ,
and accordingly for importing. The models are estimated alternatively by LDV FE and diff-GMM. In the LDV FE models, we find values of⇢ e ⇡ 0.220 (significant at the 1% level) and⇢ i ⇡ 0.0132 (not statistically significant). In the two-step diff-GMM estimations, we choose the same endogenous and pre-determined variables as well as the same number of lags as in Section 3.2. We estimate values of⇢ e ⇡ 0.182 and ⇢ i ⇡ 0.038 (both significant at the 1% level) in the diff-GMM models. 30 Figure 6 shows the estimated coefficients of the year dummies in dynamic models for the export intensity (left part) and the import intensity (right part), respectively, alongside 90% confidence intervals. The effects are changes in the trade intensities relative to 2006. Irrespective of the estimator we use, we find that the export intensity of firms has been on the rise ever since 2007, and continuously throughout the years of the financial crisis and subsequent recession. In line with the results obtained from our 29 The parameters in these equations are of course different from the ones in Equations (2) and (3), but for convenience we use the same notation as before. 30 Neither for exporting (p = 0.3758) nor for importing (p = 0.1364) can we reject the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid (Hansen specification test of the instrument condition). For both exporting (p = 0.000) and importing (p = 0.012), the Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors of order one is rejected, while that of order two cannot be rejected (p = 0.7233 for exporting and p = 0.1752 for importing). Notice that we include both exporters (importers) and non-exporters (non-importers) in the above estimations. An implicit assumption underlying this approach is that the intensive margin of trade is governed by the same factors (and in the same way) as the extensive margin. However, it is not clear theoretically why this should be the case.
For example, in the Melitz (2003) model, the workhorse model of international trade with heterogeneous firms, the foreign and domestic sales of a firm react proportionally to changes in the firm's productivity, conditional on exporting. Hence, while productivity gains are expected to increase the likelihood of a firm to export, they need not increase the export intensity of a firm that already exports. 31 To address this issue, we also model the selection into exporting and importing explicitly by using a twostage Heckman selection model with skill intensity as an exclusion restriction in the 31 This could help explain why productivity enters insignificantly in the fixed effects specification above, since changes in the export status over time are rare, while changes in the export intensity of exporters are frequent.
first-stage equation. 32 The results (not reported) indicate a selection bias for the export intensity (by a significant coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio in the second-stage equation), but not for the import intensity. While the effects of a few control variables on the export intensity (e.g. productivity) change with the selection correction compared to the SUR model, the year fixed effects hardly change at all.
Firm competitiveness and crisis resilience
According to our data, in the pre-crisis period 2005-2008, exporting and importing firms alone were responsible for about 85% of total output, and about 74% of all jobs in Spanish manufacturing. These numbers are considerably higher in 2012 (92% for output and 82% for jobs), which attests to a growing importance of the global economy for the manufacturing sector in Spain. This development is partly explained by new firms entering foreign markets in recent years, as shown in Section 3.2, but it might also be the result of an exceptional degree of competitiveness and crisis resilience of those firms that had already been active on foreign markets before the financial crisis.
Exploring this issue in greater detail is the purpose of this section. The underlying assumption is that the skill intensity of the firm determines the firm's trade status (i.e., the decision to export or import), but does not have a partial effect on the intensity of trade. 33 As explained in Section 2, effective working hours is our preferred measure of employment and should be interpreted as an input-based indicator of firm size, not as a measure of productivity. All results reported in this section look almost identical if we use the number of employees (head count) instead. 34 The precise definition of each group is given in the note to There are several insights to be gained from Figure 7 . First, firm output and employment were under strong pressure during the financial crisis and contracted sharply for all groups of firms. Both exporters and non-exporters reduced their output by more than 25% from 2007 to 2009. Those firms leaving or entering the export market reduced their output even more drastically (by more than 35%). The reductions in employment were smaller than those in output for all groups, ranging from 15% to 30%, but we observe the same ranking across firms with different export status.
Second, output and employment stabilized after 2009, but this development is fully attributable to exporters and export market entrants. Non-exporters and firms leaving the export market, in contrast, continued to shrink further. More generally, it turns out that a firm's export status is a good indicator for how well firms did both during for a first study in this direction).
Fourth, the (nominal) hourly wage paid by firms increased on average by around 7.5% from 2007 to 2008 and by a compound annual growth rate of about 2.3% thereafter. 37 Importantly, although wage moderation efforts are visible during the financial crisis, real wages continued to increase even after 2007, given a compound annual 35 Not surprisingly, firms leaving the export market in one of the years 2009-2012 performed weakest in terms of real output and employment throughout the period from 2007 to 2011. 36 One might be tempted to argue that firm-specific input and output price changes are responsible for this observation. However, firm-level input and output pricing information available in the ESEE data allow us to demonstrate that this is not the case, as we find hardly any differences in the evolution of prices between exporters and non-exporters; see Figure A .1 in Appendix A. 37 Due to data limitations we cannot distinguish wages by different types of workers (e.g. high-skilled vs. low-skilled workers). Hence, the observed wage changes at the firm level may be due to adjustments in both the wages of continuously employed individuals and the composition of employment (e.g. in terms of skills, types of contracts, or migration background).
inflation rate of 1.6% over the period 2008-2011. 38 Overall, the evolution of wages is very similar across the four different groups of firms. For exporters, real wages declined slightly after 2009, making Spanish exports more competitive internationally.
Putting these insights together, we may reflect that the Spanish labor market ad- The inflation data are elicited from consumer price data provided by the OECD at http://stats.oecd. org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MEI_PRICES. 39 This peculiarity of the Spanish labor market is heavily criticized by leading Spanish economists; see for instance chapter four in Garicano (2014) . 40 The opposite happened in Germany, where the unemployment rate hardly increased at all through the crisis years. Burda and Hunt (2011) discuss this issue as "the German Labor Market Miracle". 41 Gregory and Jukes (2001) provide empirical evidence on this mechanism by estimating the effect of unemployment on earnings following re-employment for British men over the period 1984-1994. However, one of the conclusions that can be drawn from their analysis is that human capital depreciation is lowest for young and low-paid workers and highest for middle-aged and high-paid workers. This might ameliorate concerns about the future growth of the Spanish economy, as the crisis caused an increase in unemployment mainly among less experienced and unskilled workers.
the crisis as exporters (and staying in the export market) had higher chances to survive the crisis than those starting out as non-exporters. For the sake of comparison, consider next Figure 8a , which conducts the same exercise by following the 2003 cohort of firms through the pre-crisis period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . We find that in this earlier period survival rates are higher and very similar across exporters and non-exporters. To conclude this part of our analysis, we may thus state that exporters were more resilient than non-exporters to the exceptional economic distress associated with the financial crisis and the subsequent recession. We next address the issue of performance differences between exporters and nonexporters in a more rigorous way by using econometric methods. It is a well-known fact that exporters have a competitive edge over non-exporters. Bernard and Jensen (1999) and others have shown that exporters are on average more productive than nonexporters, have higher sales, and employ more workers. These differences have been quantified in terms of so-called exporter premia. We estimate time-varying exporter premia for several measures of firm performance and document the evolution of these premia during the financial crisis and subsequent global recession. We also identify (and quantify) the advantage of exporters regarding the likelihood to survive the crisis.
Building on the methodology established in the literature, we estimate variants of the following econometric model:
where Performance it is one of the following four variables: real output (total produc-tion value, in logs), effective working hours (in logs), TFP (in logs), and survival (as a dummy variable indicating that the firm is still active and producing in the following year). As above, the variable Exporter it is a dummy variable for positive exports, t represents the coefficients of interest (with t = 05, . . . , 12), t is a year fixed effect, ks is an industry-size-group fixed effect, and " it is the error term. The vector Z it collects a number of firm-specific and time-varying control variables, and the vector ✓ includes the corresponding parameters to be estimated. This setup allows us to estimate the evolution of conditional performance differences between exporters and non-exporters, as we control for the industry-size-group combination corresponding to the firm, as well as a common set of firm-level characteristics (identical to those used in the previous section, but excluding the performance variables themselves). We estimate Equation (7) by OLS without firm fixed effects, which allows us to identify the levels of different exporter premia as well as their evolution over time. Figure 9 displays our estimates of the year-specific exporter premiaˆ t for the different performance variables. In terms of output, employment, and productivity, our results demonstrate that exporters were outperforming non-exporters throughout the period of analysis. Furthermore, these differences have been increasing over time, in particular in the years 2011 and 2012, so exporters magnified their size and productivity advantages after the financial crisis. More precisely, in 2007, exporters were on average 22% larger in terms of output and 6% larger in terms of employment compared to non-exporters. These differences had widened to more than 50% for output and 15% for employment by 2012. Similarly, exporters increased their TFP premium from 5% to 13% between 2007 and 2012.
Two comments on these results are in order. First, the estimated exporter premia accord well with the evolution of real output, employment, and TFP depicted in Figure 7. As the performance of exporters was less detrimentally affected by the crisis than the performance of non-exporters, the performance premia of exporters consequently increased over the crisis period. Second, the levels of, and the changes in, the estimated exporter premia are arguably determined by a host of different factors. 42 An investigation into these factors is beyond the scope of our analysis. In a similar vein, while our estimates show significant and increasing performance differences between exporters and non-exporters and thus point to extra benefits of exporting in times of crisis, we must emphasize that our regressions do not allow for a causal interpretation.
It seems at least conceivable that exporting firms fared better during the crisis than non-exporting firms due to factors that gained in importance in the crisis but are not 42 The usual explanation for observing positive exporter premia is that success leads to exporting (based on the idea that only the 'good' and successful firms are able to cover the additional costs associated with exporting) or that exporting leads to success (due to technology or knowledge spillovers and learning by exporting). These explanations are of course not mutually exclusive. directly related to exporting (such as superior management quality or a more flexible and efficient labor force). A rigorous analysis of these different factors and the question of whether exporting was causally associated with a stronger performance in the crisis is left for future research.
As for the estimated exporter premium for firm survival in Figure 9 , we find that it is positive throughout, but small and insignificant in the pre-crisis period. It is significantly positive for the first time in 2008, where it reaches its peak of 3.2 percentage points. This estimate suggests that exporters were more likely than non-exporters to survive the peak of the crisis and still be producing in 2009. In the subsequent years, the survival premium remains above the pre-crisis level, but is only significantly different from zero in 2011. Again, this finding is in line with the analysis in Figure 8 and suggests that exporting was beneficial for firm survival in the crisis. Survival † Note: The figure shows estimates of t in Equation (7) for t = 05, . . . , 12, alongside 95% confidence intervals. These estimates can be interpreted as year-specific exporter premia for the variables indicated in the subfigures. For output, effective working hours, and TFP, the exporter premia are given in percentages. For survival, the premium is given in percentage points. The estimated premia are conditional on the share of foreign capital in the firm's joint capital (0%; > 0% &  50%; > 50%), the firm's capital intensity, R&D intensity, skill intensity, type of good produced (intermediate good; final good; not defined), multinational status, as well as the industry-and-size-group cluster to which the firm belongs. Confidence intervals derive from robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. Source: Authors' estimations based on ESEE data. Is the fact that exporters were so much more resilient to the crisis than nonexporters special to the case of Spain, or do we observe a similar pattern in other European countries too? To answer this question, we exploit direct questions on firms' export status and their crisis performance in the EFIGE data set. As indicators of crisis performance, we compute the shares of firms (by country and export status) that reduced their sales, employment, and exports by at least 30% in 2009 compared to 2008. 43 Figure 10 suggests that Spain is indeed a special case, at least in two dimensions.
First, we see that, whether we look at exporters or non-exporters, firms in Spain were hit the hardest by the crisis in terms of overall performance. 44 The share of firms that drastically reduced their sales and their employment was larger in Spain than in any 43 The results are qualitatively similar when examining the shares of firms that experienced any reduction at all instead of applying the 30% threshold. 44 Due to data limitations, the export status refers to the year 2008 instead of 2009, but it is highly persistent in the EFIGE sample. More than 97% of exporters, but virtually none of the non-exporters, had exported before 2008 (as reported by firms in the data set).
other country covered by the EFIGE data. For example, one fifth of all non-exporting firms in Spain shed more than 30% of their labor in 2009, more than twice the share observed in any other country in our sample.
The second insight from Figure 10 is that the superior crisis performance of exporters over non-exporters seems to be the exception rather than the rule in Europe.
Not only do the EFIGE data confirm our previous findings that in Spain it was the non-exporting firms that suffered the most in 2009; the data also show that it is only in Spain that a significantly larger share of non-exporters than of exporters saw their sales plummet. The same holds true for the strong reductions in employment (with Italy being the only exception and showing a pattern similar to Spain, although on a much lower level). It would be interesting to investigate these cross-country differences (and the underlying causes) in more detail in future work.
We finally notice that in terms of export reductions Spain ranks in the middle of the seven-country sample. This is perhaps surprising in light of the strong relative export performance described in the introduction and depicted in Figure 1 . A possible explanation may be that in Spain it is very few very successful firms that are responsible for the increase in exports over the last couple of years (as suggested by Antràs, 2011 ). Moreover, one should keep in mind that in Figure 10 we As for the second channel, differential price changes may improve the competitive position of Spain even within the Eurozone, where nominal exchange rates are fixed at unity. Since the drop in aggregate demand was stronger in Spain than in most other Eurozone countries (see Figure 10 for supporting evidence), we should see a change in real exchange rates improving Spain's competitive position vis-à-vis other Eurozone countries (especially those that quickly returned to economic growth after the financial crisis arguably the Eurozone country that experienced the most adverse shock to aggregate demand, showed a development comparable to that of Spain. Hence, Spain has become more competitive internationally through internal devaluation (i.e., real wages growing less than productivity relative to other Eurozone countries).
One way to summarize this discussion is to look at the evolution of relative unit labor costs, a broad competitiveness measure that reflects both nominal exchange rate depreciation and internal devaluation at the same time. Figure 11 shows that, unlike other countries such as Germany, Italy, France, the UK, or the US, Spain has experienced a steady decline in relative unit labor costs since 2008. The decrease in relative unit labor costs was particularly pronounced in 2012, the year for which we have estimated the strongest conditional difference in both export participation and export intensity compared to the pre-crisis period (see Tables 2 and 3 Rather, the enhanced competitiveness of Spain seems closely linked to the country's problematic labor market performance. Record unemployment rates around 25% in 48 In a similar vein, Antràs (2011) argues that in terms of productivity the largest firms in Spain outperform not only their domestic peers, but also their European competitors.
2012 and 2013 put downward pressure on real wages. 49 In the face of downward nominal wage rigidity and overall low inflation rates, however, it is to a significant extent the increase in real wages in some of Spain's most important trading partners that boosted Spain's competitive position. For example, real wages in Germany increased by 3.6% (while unemployment decreased) over the period 2010-2013. This is by far the largest increase the country has experienced over any three-year period in the recent past. 50 Exports from Spain have thus clearly benefited from the cross-country differences in labor market adjustments within Europe.
An interesting implication of our analysis in Section 3.4 is that exporting firms contributed the most to enhanced aggregate competitiveness in terms of relative unit labor costs. These firms increased their output after 2009, while at the same time reducing both their employment and their real wages. While our data show that this development is not driven by technological improvements within the firm, 51 it is in sharp contrast to non-exporting firms, which continued to reduce their output and saw their productivity decline even after the financial crisis.
Substituting domestic with foreign sales
Another explanation for the strong export performance of Spain that we want to discuss in some detail is directly tied to the fact that aggregate demand was more strongly adversely affected in Spain than in many other countries in the aftermath of the financial crisis and through the subsequent years. 52 As mentioned in the introduction, Spain went through a double-dip recession in 2009 and 2011-13. The findings of our microdata analysis, in particular the observations that more firms entered the export market after the financial crisis, while existing exporters increased their share of exports in total sales, suggest that firms in Spain substituted domestic with foreign sales.
Under which conditions can we expect firms to treat domestic and foreign sales as substitutes? Not necessarily under the conditions of standard trade theory (e.g. Melitz, 2003) , where firms maximize profits in the domestic and the export market independently of one another. Moreover, failure in one market might actually trigger failure in the other market, for example when liquidity constraints take hold (as sales in the domestic market might generate the extra liquidity necessary to generate sales in the foreign market). However, two recent papers construct theoretical models that help rationalize a substitutive rather than complementary relationship between domestic 49 See Eurostat data available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs/data/database. 50 See the (real) wage data available from the OECD at http://stats.oecd.org/.
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As shown in Figure 7 , exporting firms had about the same level of TFP in 2009 as in 2011.
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For example, GDP data from INE as well as the data depicted in Figure 10 suggest that the drop in aggregate demand in 2009-2012 was more dramatic in Spain than in most of its major trading partners. and foreign sales. Both papers are based on the assumption of production costs being convex in the short run; we briefly discuss both of these papers in turn and argue that they are likely to be relevant in the Spanish case.
A first explanation is advanced by Vannoorenberghe (2012) . In his model with labor as the only factor of production, firms face increasing marginal costs of production in the short run, as it becomes increasingly expensive for the firm to employ more labor. This implies a negative correlation between foreign and domestic sales within the firm, and a negative domestic demand shock will induce the firm to sell larger quantities on the export market in the short run. The overall rigidity and dual nature of the Spanish labor market, granting high job protection to permanent employees, makes such cost convexities very likely, as they might rule out the first-best response of firms to demand shocks (in terms of adjusting the labor input). Hence, the theory by Vannoorenberghe (2012) might partly explain the significant increase in the export intensity of incumbent exporters over the crisis period that we have identified in Table 3 .
Can a slump in domestic demand also trigger the entry of new firms into the export market that we observe in Spain after 2009? Focusing on the extensive margin, Blum et al. (2013) set up a Melitz (2003) model in which firms face capacity constraints due to investments in fixed capital ex ante (i.e., before demand shocks in the domestic and the export market are known to the firm). 53 This assumption again implies convex production costs in the short run. In response to an adverse shock to domestic demand, their model predicts not only a shift of sales to the foreign market within exporters (as in Vannoorenberghe, 2012) , but also export market entry of firms that were previously confined to the domestic market. The intuition for this prediction is that if capacity is utilized below a certain threshold, it is optimal for the firm to bear the cost of exporting. For some firms, exporting then essentially serves as a means to survive the shock.
Extreme changes in domestic demand, like the deep recession in Spain, can thus push more firms into the export market in the short run. This intuition is also in line with the findings by Belke et al. (2015) , who provide empirical support for a substitutive relationship between domestic and foreign sales in their analysis of macro data for sev- Figure 12 demonstrates that our micro data are consistent with an explanation based on capacity constraints and hence convex production costs in the short run. It depicts the evolution of average capacity utilization by groups of firms defined according to their export status (in analogy to Figure 7) . From 2007 to 2009, capacity utilization dropped from above 82% to below 73% for all groups of firms. A reduction of this size seems large enough to trigger the above-mentioned adjustments. Of particular interest is the heterogeneity in this drop and the development during the later years. On the one hand, for continuous non-exporters, capacity utilization continued to decline after 2009, giving rise to an accumulated loss of 17 percentage points (20%) for the period from 2007 to 2011. 54 For continuous and new exporters, on the other hand, capacity utilization not only declined by less from 2007 to 2009, but it also increased again after 2009. Interestingly, export market entrants show the most favorable development over the observed period, which suggests that starting to export indeed helped these firms to exploit otherwise unused (and costly) capacities. Taken together, the available evidence suggests that cost convexities might have contributed to the fact that firms 54 Firms leaving the export market experienced an even larger decline of 20 percentage points (25%). rely more on exports today than before the financial crisis, as we have documented in our main analysis.
Conclusion
We have explored a rich firm-level data set from Spain to provide novel evidence on firm behavior during and after the 2008 financial crisis. We have investigated changes at the extensive and intensive firm-level margins of trade, as well as performance differences (jobs, productivity, and firm survival) between exporting and non-exporting firms. We find that the trade collapse in 2009 is almost fully explained by adjustments at the intensive margin. The number of firms that were forced to exit the export market due to the crisis is negligible, and firms allocated a larger fraction of their sales to foreign markets, especially in the years after 2010. Moreover, we find a growing performance gap between exporters and non-exporters, which shows that exporters proved to be more resilient to the economic challenges they were facing during the global financial crisis and subsequent recession. Exporters now account for a larger share of output and jobs, and they contribute more to aggregate productivity than before the financial crisis. However, we observe a decline in the aggregate productivity of the manufacturing sector as a whole over the crisis period. These findings are of direct relevance for the ongoing political debate about the current and future economic situation in Spain.
We conclude by pointing out some interesting similarities between the current situation in Spain and the situation observed more than a decade ago in Germany. 55 From the mid-1990s and into the 2000s, Germany suffered from high unemployment and poor economic growth. However, relative unit labor costs had set out to decrease in 1995, boosting German exports through a gradual improvement of the country's competitive position in the global economy. The same seems to be currently happening in Spain. At the time of the financial crisis, Germany had already been the world champion of exports for several years, economic growth had returned, and unemployment had been brought down. Germany had transformed itself from the "sick man of Europe" into an "economic superstar" (Dustmann et al., 2014) .
A compelling narrative behind this development, advanced by Dustmann et al. (2014) , is that German labor market institutions were flexible enough to allow for a significant decentralization of the wage-setting process, away from the industry level towards the firm level. This decentralization, largely triggered by the fall of the iron curtain and the pressures of economic globalization, translated into a considerable decline in real wages at the lower end of the wage distribution, and ultimately to a 55 See also the article "Spain's economy: Not yet the new Germany," published on March 9th, 2013, by The Economist. more competitive economy. It was one of the principal aims of the 2012 labor market reform in Spain to widen the scope of collective bargaining at the firm level (OECD, 2014) . Future research will need to show whether this reform can contribute to a betterfunctioning labor market that can mimic the German success and further enhance the international competitiveness of Spanish exports.
